Yet more total cognitive dissonance.
The EU's central project, and you can argue this one till the cows come home, is the political, economic, fiscal and monetary unification of its member states. Free movement (of goods, services, capital and workers) is part of this project, as is EMU. The latter, in its manifestation as the Eurozone, lays down clear rules (which are applicable to all member states, in or out of the EZ), amongst the most important of which decree that member states may not have a budget deficit which exceeds 3% of GDP, and the debt/GDP ratio should not be higher than 60%. In the case of EZ states exceeding these levels, the EC calls for austerity measures in order to limit the budgets on the pain of substantial fines. Following the financial crash of 2007/8 and the sovereign debt crisis in the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) countries and Cyprus, the EU 'troika' (the IMF, ECB and EC) imposed harsh austerity measures in return for bailout lifelines. The austerity drive spread to countries beyond the PIIGS which were also caught up in the financial crisis - France, Germany and the UK. Austerity was virtually de-rigeur across Europe, and it was very much an EU policy. ECB QE, which allowed interest rates to fall to 0%, helped the bailout countries in terms of contributing towards meeting the austerity demands (though usually also at the price of much higher debt/GDP ratios), and all have now voted in anti-austerity governments which have introduced more generous budgets. It is widely argued that EU austerity ceased some years ago, though it remains a central tenet of German and EC policy. Many EU/EZ countries exceed the EU's budget deficit rules, often by substantial degrees (Italy debt/GDP is 131%, Greece 170%, France 97%, even Germany at 64%), and with budgets being pushed towards or beyond the 3% limit and the ECB closing down QE, it is pretty difficult not to argue that with the kinds of contractions that are looming or actually happening in global trade the EU is going to be hit with a new wave of sovereign debt emergencies that, with no further ammunition in the ECB's fiscal warchest, may make the last lot look fairly quaint and old fashioned.