I recieved this some time ago from someone with whom I was discusssing (ok, arguing with) about voting systems. Sometimes, clients let off steam about subjects more wide-ranging than goddam computers. I therefore submit this for consideration.
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There are two major problems with any form of PR:
(1) The link between the parliamentary representatives and their constituencies is necessarily broken. There are mixed systems with some members elected for constituencies and some from a party list, but they are very messy and do not thoroughly address the main objection to FPTP -- namely, the failure to produce representatives in proportion to the votes cast nationally.
(2) In other countries which use PR, the political classes almost invariably engage in what amounts to conspiracy between themselves against the electorate. This happens because majorities for one party are rare and where there is a situation of more or less permanent coalition, no party can stand on a meaningful manifesto because no government will deliver on any partys manifesto (or come close to it) unless a coalition is made up of parties whose policies are close to identical.
Result: politicians can rarely be held to account for failing to deliver.
It is also true that many forms of PR are complex compared with FPTP and the types of PR which would be likely to be adopted are those which would have fair degree of complexity; eg: Single Transferrable Vote. This would confuse a significant part of the electorate that AV fiasco is a lesson here which could drive those people away from voting, and we don't need that. Nor is it clear that having first and second or even more preferences (per voter) invariably produces a more representative result. As above, it is rare for any two candidates, even those of the major parties, to represent policies which overall are similar enough to make the second choice a satisfying option.
What would be better than PR?
The Henderson method retains the first past the post system with MPs representing the people who elect them, but moves from single-member constituencies to double-member constituencies. This would remove much of the objection to FPTP as now and bring additional benefits.
Each constituency would be roughly double the size of the present constituencies. A maximum of two candidates for each political party would be able to stand in each double constituency. This would allow a single party to get an overall majority.
Electors would be able to vote for two candidates. The two candidates with the most votes in each constituency would be elected regardless of how far behind the leading candidate the second candidate came, and second or additional preferences would not exist. The beneficial effects of such a system would be:
a) No more "safe seats". There would still be constituencies which returned one party over and over again, but the likelihood of both MPs in a constituency coming from the same party would be relatively small because of the much greater size of the double constituencies. In most cases this would mean a much more mixed electorate both socially and politically than in constituencies half the size, although it does mean that the onus would be on the Boundary Commission to do their job properly.
b) The constituency connection between the voter and MP would be maintained.
c) Electors would be able to vote for the candidate they favoured with a greater chance of getting them elected. If the voter favoured one of the two presently major parties there would be a very strong chance that at least one of their chosen candidates would be one of the two candidates sent to the Commons. But even electors who voted for the lesser parties would have some real expectation of success for their chosen candidate, because there are many constituencies where the second party in a constituency is not Conservative or Labour.
In addition, the fact that those coming second in an election could be elected on a substantially smaller vote than those coming first would increase the likelihood of minor party candidates being elected. Moreover, once such a system was up and running and electors saw how it worked, the patterns of voting could and almost certainly would begin to change with more and more people being willing to risk voting for what are now smaller parties.
d) Such constituencies would allow for MPs of radically different views to represent the same set of voters. This would mean most voters would be able to have an MP to represent them whose party policies bore at least some resemblance to the policies they themselves favoured. Even if a voter was in a constituency which had two MPs of the same party, they would still have a choice of two MPs to go to for help and advice.
e) Because two MPs from different parties would be elected in each constituency and there is greater opportunity for minor party MPs or even independent MPs being elected, the relationship between votes cast and MPs elected for each of the parties would be much closer than it is under the FPTP system we currently use.
However, unlike PR, the double-member constituency would only mitigate rather than remove entirely the disproportion between votes cast and seats obtained under single-member constituencies. This is worth tolerating because it would avoid the undesirable state of permanent coalition. In terms of party representation and electoral support it would be a 'halfway-house' between what we have now and the conspiracy of permanent coalition which is virtually guaranteed by any form of PR.
Other changes to improve the balance of power:
Institute a power for electors' recall of MPs through a referendum conducted in their constituency.
Citizen initiated referenda on the Swiss model, with tight legal underpinning to ensure that politicians abide by the result of a referendum and take the necessary practical steps to ensure that the will of the electors is realised.
Taken overall, this would not entirely remove the anomalies and unfairness found in our present FPTP system, but it would remove most of the poison in the system by giving smaller parties much greater opportunity to gain Commons seats, whilst retaining the good things such as constituency representation and overall simplicity.
It is worth adding that a significant part of Britains present electoral deficiencies stem substantially from the UK's membership of the EU (which increasingly constrains what her major political parties can offer by way of policy) and the imbalance of the present devolution settlement which leaves England out in the cold. Of course, if Britain left the EU and switched to a truly federal system which would include an English Parliament, that in itself would make the present British system function more democratically and would enhance the benefits of the above. However, the costs of that additional layer could be substantial if not implemented in a common-sense manner.
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There are two major problems with any form of PR:
(1) The link between the parliamentary representatives and their constituencies is necessarily broken. There are mixed systems with some members elected for constituencies and some from a party list, but they are very messy and do not thoroughly address the main objection to FPTP -- namely, the failure to produce representatives in proportion to the votes cast nationally.
(2) In other countries which use PR, the political classes almost invariably engage in what amounts to conspiracy between themselves against the electorate. This happens because majorities for one party are rare and where there is a situation of more or less permanent coalition, no party can stand on a meaningful manifesto because no government will deliver on any partys manifesto (or come close to it) unless a coalition is made up of parties whose policies are close to identical.
Result: politicians can rarely be held to account for failing to deliver.
It is also true that many forms of PR are complex compared with FPTP and the types of PR which would be likely to be adopted are those which would have fair degree of complexity; eg: Single Transferrable Vote. This would confuse a significant part of the electorate that AV fiasco is a lesson here which could drive those people away from voting, and we don't need that. Nor is it clear that having first and second or even more preferences (per voter) invariably produces a more representative result. As above, it is rare for any two candidates, even those of the major parties, to represent policies which overall are similar enough to make the second choice a satisfying option.
What would be better than PR?
The Henderson method retains the first past the post system with MPs representing the people who elect them, but moves from single-member constituencies to double-member constituencies. This would remove much of the objection to FPTP as now and bring additional benefits.
Each constituency would be roughly double the size of the present constituencies. A maximum of two candidates for each political party would be able to stand in each double constituency. This would allow a single party to get an overall majority.
Electors would be able to vote for two candidates. The two candidates with the most votes in each constituency would be elected regardless of how far behind the leading candidate the second candidate came, and second or additional preferences would not exist. The beneficial effects of such a system would be:
a) No more "safe seats". There would still be constituencies which returned one party over and over again, but the likelihood of both MPs in a constituency coming from the same party would be relatively small because of the much greater size of the double constituencies. In most cases this would mean a much more mixed electorate both socially and politically than in constituencies half the size, although it does mean that the onus would be on the Boundary Commission to do their job properly.
b) The constituency connection between the voter and MP would be maintained.
c) Electors would be able to vote for the candidate they favoured with a greater chance of getting them elected. If the voter favoured one of the two presently major parties there would be a very strong chance that at least one of their chosen candidates would be one of the two candidates sent to the Commons. But even electors who voted for the lesser parties would have some real expectation of success for their chosen candidate, because there are many constituencies where the second party in a constituency is not Conservative or Labour.
In addition, the fact that those coming second in an election could be elected on a substantially smaller vote than those coming first would increase the likelihood of minor party candidates being elected. Moreover, once such a system was up and running and electors saw how it worked, the patterns of voting could and almost certainly would begin to change with more and more people being willing to risk voting for what are now smaller parties.
d) Such constituencies would allow for MPs of radically different views to represent the same set of voters. This would mean most voters would be able to have an MP to represent them whose party policies bore at least some resemblance to the policies they themselves favoured. Even if a voter was in a constituency which had two MPs of the same party, they would still have a choice of two MPs to go to for help and advice.
e) Because two MPs from different parties would be elected in each constituency and there is greater opportunity for minor party MPs or even independent MPs being elected, the relationship between votes cast and MPs elected for each of the parties would be much closer than it is under the FPTP system we currently use.
However, unlike PR, the double-member constituency would only mitigate rather than remove entirely the disproportion between votes cast and seats obtained under single-member constituencies. This is worth tolerating because it would avoid the undesirable state of permanent coalition. In terms of party representation and electoral support it would be a 'halfway-house' between what we have now and the conspiracy of permanent coalition which is virtually guaranteed by any form of PR.
Other changes to improve the balance of power:
Institute a power for electors' recall of MPs through a referendum conducted in their constituency.
Citizen initiated referenda on the Swiss model, with tight legal underpinning to ensure that politicians abide by the result of a referendum and take the necessary practical steps to ensure that the will of the electors is realised.
Taken overall, this would not entirely remove the anomalies and unfairness found in our present FPTP system, but it would remove most of the poison in the system by giving smaller parties much greater opportunity to gain Commons seats, whilst retaining the good things such as constituency representation and overall simplicity.
It is worth adding that a significant part of Britains present electoral deficiencies stem substantially from the UK's membership of the EU (which increasingly constrains what her major political parties can offer by way of policy) and the imbalance of the present devolution settlement which leaves England out in the cold. Of course, if Britain left the EU and switched to a truly federal system which would include an English Parliament, that in itself would make the present British system function more democratically and would enhance the benefits of the above. However, the costs of that additional layer could be substantial if not implemented in a common-sense manner.
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