Thanks. Always good to read Pankaj Mishra.
Not so keen on the other link you shared though.
Instead, here's Adam Tooze with an interesting historical comparison:
https://www.theguardian.com/comment...-lend-lease-act-ukraine-1941-second-world-war
I'm no historian so I'd be interested to hear what others make of this.
Agree with much of it, except I am surprised at that claim that "Most historians today would argue that the president’s intentions [to go to war with Germany] were more uncertain." I've read Roosevelt's orders to the Navy regarding Atlantic convoy operations in the Lend-Lease period. They amounted to 'fire on the Germans with the least excuse.' The desire to provoke a war-starting incident was palpable. In addition to, as Tooze notes, 'horror' in Russia and Britain when the US declared war on Japan, there was common thought in Washington that we were suddenly stuck in 'the wrong war,' until Hitler straightened the problem out. After that, the decision was promptly taken to tackle "Germany first."
And I literally scoff at the notion that it was a central strategy to lay waste to Germany with atomic weapons. Sure there were air power enthusiasts who put forward ideas of winning the war with strategic bombing, but such notions never displaced the strategy of defeating Hitler's armies in Europe, and a build up of sufficient ground forces was laid on. I doubt if any of the air-partisans were even privy to the closely-held Manhattan Project, nor was it ever certain, until late in the war, if or when working bombs would be obtained. A strategy of devastating Germany with dozens of A-Bombs would have been a disastrous gamble, which would have failed as no such numbers of bombs would have been available. I doubt that anyone in the war planning establishments, other than the highest commanders and dedicated special task groups, even knew of the existence of the atomic weapon program, and those commanders were surely aware of the actual test and delivery schedule as it became clear: three bombs in second half of 1945, slow production thereafter. So I do not think we ever had any such plan.
While a policy of totally de-industrializing Germany after the war, making it a 'pastoral' nation that could not again threaten war, was publicly discussed, with some adherents in the government and military, it was never adopted as policy. Its implications of a co-committent depopulation of Germany were of course ghastly.